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Intelligent Agents
Intelligent Agents I
According to a classical definition, an intelligent agent is a
computational system capable of autonomous action and perception
in some environment
Reminder: Computational autonomy
Agents are autonomous as they encapsulate (the thread of ) control
Control does not pass through agent boundaries
only data (knowledge, information) crosses agent boundaries
Agents have no interface, cannot be controlled, nor can they be
invoked
Looking at agents, MAS can be conceived as an aggregation of
multiple distinct loci of control interacting with each other by
exchanging information
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Intelligent Agents
Intelligent Agents II
Question: What about the other notions of autonomy?
Autonomy with respect to other agents
Autonomy with respect to environment
Autonomy with respect to humans
Autonomy with respect to oneself, moral autonomy
. . .
Question: What is intelligence to autonomy?
Any sort of intelligence?
Which intelligence for which autonomy?
Which intelligent architecture for which autonomy?
. . .
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Intelligent Agents
Actions and Perception
Actions are supposed to change the environment in order to meet
agents design objectives
Perception is a process by which the agent recognises the state of the
environment, so as to be able to adapt its behaviour to it
ENVIRONMENT
AGENT(s)
Actions Perception
[Russell and Norvig, 2002]
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Intelligent Agents
The perception function is the agent’s ability to observe its
environment
Output of the perception function is a percept
Perception : E → Per
which maps environment states to percepts
The Action function represents the agent’s decision making process
Output of the action function is an action
Action : Per∗ → Ac
which maps sequences of percepts to actions
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Intelligent Agents
Autonomy
As we know, the main point about agents is they are autonomous:
capable of acting independently, encapsulating control over their
internal state.
Thus, an agent is a computer system capable of autonomous actions in
some environment
What’s about agent’s behaviour? The most typically-mentioned
features are
Reactivity
Situatedness
Pro-activeness
Social ability
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Intelligent Agents
Reactivity
Application in real world domains are characterised by highly dynamic
conditions: situations change, information is incomplete, resources are
scarce, the actions performed are not deterministic in their effects
A reactive system is one that maintains an ongoing interaction with
its environment, and responds to changes that occour in it—in time
for the response to be useful
Purely reactive agents decide what to do without reference to their
history
Reaction is entirely based on the present, with no reference to past
states
e.g. stimolous → response rules
action : E → Ac
A thermostat is a purely reactive agent
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Intelligent Agents
Situatedness
Reactive models and state-less agency are not enough for entities
engaged in dynamic environments
Such entities continually face with external events requiring adequate
services and behavioural responses
Any “ground” model of action is strictly coupled with the context
where the action takes place
An agent comes with its own model of action
Any agent is then strictly coupled with the environment where it lives
and (inter)acts by the very actions it is capable of
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Intelligent Agents
Proactiveness
We want agents able to intelligently adapt to their environment
autonomously (re)adapting to changes
recognising opportunities
goal-oriented behaviour
Proactiveness is a generative approach
agents generate and attempt to achieve their objectives
encapsulate control, and the rule to govern it
not driven solely by stimuli
take the initiative and make something happen, rather than waiting for
something to happen
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Intelligent Agents
Social Ability
MAS can be conceived as an articulated world
where we cannot go around attempting to achieve goals without taking
other entities into account
Some goals can only be achieved with the cooperation of others
Thus, Social ability in agents is the ability to interact with other
agents (and possibly humans) via some kind of agent-communication
means
Speech-Acts
Artifact based Interactions
Signals
Environment traces
. . .
Coordination is social: cooperation, collaboration, but also
competition with others
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Intelligent Agents
Agents with State
To face these growing complexities, stateful agents can be conceived
These agents have some internal data structure, which is typically
used to record information about the environment state and history
Let I be the set of all internal states of the agent. The perception
function is the same:
Perception : E → Per
The action-selection function action is now defined as a mapping:
Action : I → Ac
from internal states to actions.
An additional function next is introduced, which maps an internal
state and percept to an internal state: Next : I x Per → I
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Intelligent Agents
Implementing an Agent with Internal State
Agent Control Loop Version 1
1: while true
2: observe the environment state ’e’ and generates a perception(e);
3: update internal state model:
i ::= next(i, perception(e));
4: select an action to execute:
action(i);
5: end while
We now have the problem to define such agent states
How to build an effective internal state model?
How to make it run? How to update it?
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Intentional Systems
Intentional Systems
An idea is to refer to human attitudes as intentional notions
When explaining human activity, it is often useful to make statements
such as the following:
Felipe got rain tires because he believed it was going to rain
Lewis is working hard because he wants to win his first world
championship
These statements can be read in terms of folk psychology , by which
human behaviour can be explained and can be predicted through the
attribution of mental attitudes, such as believing and wanting (as in
the above examples), hoping, fearing, and so on.
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Intentional Systems
The Intentional Stance
The philosopher – cognitive scientist – Daniel Dennett coined the
term Intentional System to describe entities ‘whose behaviour can be
predicted by the method of attributing to it belief, desires and
rational acumen’ [Dennett, 1971].
Dennett identifies several grades of intentional systems:
1 A first-order intentional system has beliefs, desires, etc.
Felipe believes P
2 A second-order intentional system has beliefs, desires, etc. about
beliefs, desires, etc. both its own and of others
Felipe believes that Lewis believes P
3 A third-order intentional system is then something like
Felipe believes that Lewis believes that Felipe believes P
4 . . .
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Intentional Systems
The Intentional Stance in Computing
What entities can be described in terms of intentional stance?
Human beings are prone to provide an intentional stance to almost
anything
sacrifices for ingratiating gods benevolence
animism
‘Ascribing mental qualities like beliefs, intentions and wants to a
machine is sometimes correct if done conservatively and is sometimes
necessary to express what is known about its state [...] it is useful
when the ascription helps us understand the structure of the machine,
its past or future behaviour, or how to repair or improve it’
[McCarthy, 1979]
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Agents with Mental States
Agents as Intentional Systems
As computer systems become ever more complex, we need more
powerful abstractions and metaphors to explain their operation
With complexity growing, mechanicistic / low level explanations
become impractical
The intentional notions can be adopted as abstraction tools, providing
us with a convenient and familiar way of describing, explaining, and
predicting the behaviour of complex systems
The idea is to use the intentional stance as an abstraction in
computing in order to explain, understand, drive the behaviour—then,
crucially, program computer systems
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Agents with Mental States
Agents as Intentional Systems
Strong Notion of Agency
Early agent theorists start from a (strong) notion of agents as
intentional systems
Agents were explained in terms of mental attitudes, or mental states
In their social abilities, agents simplest consistent description implied
the intentional stance
Agents contain an explicitly-represented – symbolic – model of the
world (written somewhere in the working memory)
Agents make decision on what action to take in order to achieve their
goals via symbolic reasoning
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Agents with Mental States
When?
Mental states are a worth abstraction for developing agents to effectively
act in a class of application domains characterized by various practical
limitations and requirements [Rao and Georgeff, 1995]
At any instant of time there are many different ways in which an
environment may evolve (the environment is not deterministic)
At any instant of time there are many actions or procedures the agent
may execute (the agent is not deterministic, too)
At any instant of time the agent may want to achieve several
objectives
The actions or procedures that (best) achieve the various objectives
are dependent on the state of the environment (i.e., on the particular
situation, context)
The environment can only be sensed locally
The rate at which computations and actions can be carried out is
within reasonable bounds to the rate at which the environment
evolves
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Agents with Mental States
Goal-Oriented & Goal-Directed Systems
There are two main families of architectures for agents with mental
states
Teleo-Reactive / Goal-Oriented Agents are based on their internal
design model and their control mechanism. The Goal is
not figured within the internal state but it is an ‘end
state’ for agents internal state machine
Deliberative / Goal-Directed Agents are based on a further symbolyc
reasoning about Goals, which are explicitely represented
and processed aside the control loop
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Agents with Mental States
Conceiving Agents with Mental States
Modelling agents based on mental states. . .
. . . eases the development of agents exhibiting complex behaviour
. . . provides us with a familiar, non-techical way of understanding
and explaining agents
. . . allows the developer to build MAS by taking the perspective of a
cognitive entity engaged in complex tasks – what would I do in the
same situation?
. . . simplifies the construction, maintainance and verification of
agent-based applications
. . . is useful when the agent has to comunicate and interact with
users or other system entities
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Agents with Mental States
Conceiving agents with mental states
“The intentional stance is the strategy of interpreting the behaviour
of an entity (person, animal, artifact, whatever) by treating it as if it
were a rational agent who governed its ‘choice’ of ‘action’ by a
‘consideration’ of its ‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’ ”.
“The scare-quotes around all these terms draw attention to the fact
that some of their standard connotations may be set aside in the
interests of exploiting their central features: their role in practical
reasoning , and hence in the prediction of the behaviour of practical
reasoners” [Dennett, 2007].
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Agents with Mental States
Agents with Mental States
Agents with Mental States
Agents governing their behaviour on the basis of internal states that
mimic cognitive mental states
Epistemic States representing agents knowledge (of their world)
i.e., Percepts, Beliefs
Motivational States representing agents objectives
i.e., Goals, Desires
The process of selecting an action to execute based on the actual
mental states ( i.e., action(next(i , perception(e)) ) is called Practical
Reasoning
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Practical and Epistemic Reasoning
What Practical Reasoning is
Practical reasoning is reasoning directed towards actions—the process
of figuring out what to do in order to achieve what is desired
“Practical reasoning is a matter of weighing conflicting considerations
for and against competing options, where the relevant considerations
are provided by what the agent desires/values/cares about and what
the agent believes.” [Bratman, 1987]
What Epistemic Reasoning is
Epistemic reasoning is reasoning directed towards knowledge—the
process of updating information, replacing old information (no longer
consistent with the world state) with new information
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Practical Reasoning
What Practical Reasoning is
Cognitive practical reasoning consists of two main activities
Deliberation when the agent makes decision on what state of affairs
the agent desire to achieve
Means-Ends Reasoning when the agent makes decisions on how to
achieve these state of affairs
The output of the Deliberation phase are the Intentions—what agent
desires to achieve, or what he desires to do
The output of Means-Ends is in selecting a given course of
actions—the workflow of actions the agent need to do to achieve the
Goals
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Basic Architecture of a Mentalistic Agent
Perception
Action
Plans
Reasoning
Beliefs
Agent
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Intentions and Practical Reasoning I
1 Intentions pose problems for agents who need to determine ways of
achieving them. If I have an intention to φ, you would expect me to
devote resources to deciding how to bring about φ.
2 Intentions provide a filter for adopting other intentions, which must
not conflict. If I have an intention to φ, you would not expect me to
adopt an intention ψ such that φ and ψ are mutually exclusive.
3 Agents track the success of their intentions, and are inclined to try
again if their attempts fail. If an agent’s first attempt to achieve φ
fails, then all other things being equal, it will try an alternative plan
to achieve φ.
4 Agents believe their intentions are possible. That is, they believe that
there is at least some way that the intentions could be brought about.
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Intentions and Practical Reasoning II
5 Agents do not believe they will not bring about their intentions. It
would not be rational for me to adopt an intention to φ if I believed φ
was not possible.
6 Under certain circumstances, agents believe they will bring about
their intentions. It would not normally be rational of me to believe
that I would bring my intentions about; intentions can fail. Moreover,
it does not make sense that if I believe φ is inevitable that I would
adopt it as an intention.
7 Agents need not intend all the expected side effects of their
intentions. If I believe φ→ ψ and I intend that φ, I do not necessarily
intend ψ also. (Intentions are not closed under implication.)
This last problem is known as the side effect or package deal problem.
I may believe that going to the dentist involves pain, and I may also
intend to go to the dentist – but this does not imply that I intend to
suffer pain!
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Intentions vs. Desires
The adoption of an intention follows the rise af a given Desire (i.e.
follows the adoption of a given Goal);
Desires and Intentions are different concepts:
“My desire to play basketball this afternoon is merely a potential
influencer of my conduct this afternoon. It must vie with my other
relevant desires [...] before it is settled what I will do”.
“In contrast, once I intend to play basketball this afternoon, the matter
is settled: I normally need not continue to weigh the pros and cons.
When the afternoon arrives, I will normally just proceed to execute my
intentions.” [Bratman, 1990]
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
What Means-Ends Reasoning is
Means-Ends Reasoning
The basic idea is to provide agents with three kinds of
Representations:
Representation of Goal/Intention to achieve
Representation of Actions – Plans – in repertoire
Representation of Environment
Given the environmental conditions, means-ends reasoning will find a
Plan to achieve the adopted Goal
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Mean-Ends Reasoning
The selected intention is an emergent property, reified at runtime by
selecting a given plan for achieving a given goal.
Means-Ends
  (planner)
Tasks
(Goals/Intentions)
State of Environment
(Beliefs)
Possible Actions
(Plan library)
Intention /
Plan to Achieve a 
Goal
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Intentions and Practical Reasoning
Implementing a Pratical Reasoning Agent
Agent Control Loop Version 2
1: while true
2: observe the world;
3: update internal world model (beliefs);
4: deliberate which intention to adopt next;
5: use means-ends reasoning to get a plan for the given intention;
6: execute the plan;
7: end while;
Perception
Action
Plans
Reasoning
Beliefs
Agent
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BDI Agents
Implementing a Pratical Reasoning Agent
Problem: Agents have Bounded Resources (bounded rationality)
Deliberation and Means-Ends processes are not for free: they have
computational costs
The time taken to reason and the time taken to act are potentially
unbounded, thereby destroying the reactivity and the promptness that
is essential to agent survival (fitness)
Suppose the agent
starts deliberating at t0
begins means-ends at t1
begins executing a plan at t2
ends executing a plan at t3
Time for Deliberation is
tdeliberation = t1 − t0
Time for Means-Ends reasoning is
tmeansend = t2 − t1
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BDI Agents
Agents environments are supposed to be highly dynamic
Many concurrent changhes may occur during agent decision-making as
well as during the execution of plans
The deliberated intention is worth when it is calculated—say, at t0
At time t1, the agent will select a goal/intention that would have been
optimal if it had been achieved at t0
The agent runs the risk that the intention selected is no longer
optimal – or no longer achievable – by the time the agent has
committed to it
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BDI Agents
So, this agent will have overall optimal behaviour in the following
circumstances:
1 When deliberation and means-ends reasoning take a vanishingly small
amount of time
2 When the world is guaranteed to remain (essentially) static while the
agent is deliberating and performing means-ends reasoning, so that
the assumptions upon which the choice of intention to achieve and
plan to achieve the intention remain valid until the agent has
completed both deliberation and means-ends reasoning
3 When an intention that is optimal when achieved at t0 (the time at
which the world is observed) is guaranteed to remain optimal until t2
(the time at which the agent has found a course of action to achieve
the intention)
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BDI Agents
BDI Agents
The abstract architecture proposed by [Rao and Georgeff, 1992] comprise
three dynamic and global structures representing agent’s Beliefs, Desires
and Intentions (BDI), along with an input queue of events.
Update (write) and Query (read) operations are possible upon the
three structures
Update operation are subject to compatibility requirements
Formalised constraints hold upon the mental attitudes
The events that the system is able to recognise could be either
external (i.e., coming from the environment) or internal ones (i.e.,
coming from some reflexive action)
Events are assumed to be atomic and can be recognized after they
have occurred
Andrea Omicini (DISI, Univ. Bologna) 3 - Intentional Agents A.Y. 2013/2014 41 / 60
BDI Agents
Implementing a BDI Agent
Agent Control Loop Version 3 [Rao and Georgeff, 1995]
1. initialize-state();
2. while true do
3. options := option-generator(event-queue);
4. selected-options := deliberate(options);
5. update-intentions(selected-options);
6. execute();
7. get-new-external-events();
8. drop-successful-attitudes();
9. drop-impossible-attitudes();
10. end-while
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BDI Agents
1 The agent initializes the internal states
2 The agent enters the main loop
3 The option generator reads the event queue and returns a list of
options
4 The deliberator selects a subset of options to be adopted and adds
these to the intention structure
5 The intentions to be adopted are filtered from the selected ones
6 If there is an intention to perform an atomic action at this point in
time the agent executes it
7 Any external events that have occurred during the interpreter cycle
are then added to the event queue (the same for internal events)
8 The agent modifies the intention and the desire structures by
dropping successful ones
9 Finally, impossible desires and intentions are dropped too
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BDI Agents
More formally:
Agent Control Loop Version 4
1. B:=B0;
2. I:=I0;
3. while true do
4. get new percept Γ;
5. B:=brf (Γ,B);
6. I:=deliberate(B);
8. pi:=plan(B, I);
9. execute(pi);
10. end−while
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BDI Agents
How does a BDI Agent Deliberate?
Till now, we gave no indication on how reasoning procedures of
deliberation and option generation can be made sufficiently fast to satisfy
the real time demands placed upon the cognitive system.
Deliberation can be decomposed in two phases:
Option Generation understand what are the available alternatives
Deliberation choose (and filter) between the adoptable goals/intentions
Chosen options are then intentions, so the agents commit to the selected
ones—and executes them.
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BDI Agents
Refining Deliberation Function
Option Generation the agent generates a set of possible alternatives;
represents option generation via a function, options, which
takes agent’s current beliefs and current intentions, and from
them determines a set of options (= desires).
Deliberation the agent chooses between competing alternatives, and
commits to the intention to achieving them. In order to
select between competing options, an agent uses a filter
function.
the strategy for deliberating between goals typically is in
the hands of the agent developer
most BDI programming platforms provide mechanisms
to describe under which conditions some goal should
inhibit the others (Goal Formulae)
typically, such Goal Formulae are first-order logic
predicates indicating contexts and trigger conditions
Game Theory can enter the picture: i.e., Maximizing
‘Expected Utilities’
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BDI Agents
BDI Agent Control Loop
Agent Control Loop Version 5
1. B:=B0;
2. I:=I0;
3. while true do
4. get new percept Γ;
5. B:=brf (Γ,B);
6. D:=options(B, I);
7. I:=filter(B,D, I);
8. pi:=plan(B, I);
9. execute(pi);
10. end−while
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BDI Agents
Structure of BDI Systems
BDI architectures are based on the following constructs
A set of Beliefs
A set of Desires (or Goals)
A set of Intentions
or better, a subset of the goals with an associated stack of plans for
achieving them. These are the intended actions
A set of Internal Events
elicited by a belief change (i.e., updates, addition, deletion) or by goal
events (i.e. a goal achievement, or a new goal adoption)
A set of External Events
perceptive events coming form the interaction with external entities
(i.e. message arrival, signals, etc.)
A Plan library (repertoire of actions) as a further (static) component
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BDI Agents
Basic Architecture of a BDI Agent [Wooldridge, 2002]
BRF
Effectors
Action
Filter
Beliefs
Desires
Intentions
Agent
Generate
Options
Sensors
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BDI Agents
Post-Declarative Systems
Someone said that this approach leads to a kind of post-declarative
programming
In procedural programming, we say exactly what a system should do
In declarative programming, we state something that we want to
achieve, give the system general info about the relationships between
objects, and let a built-in control mechanism (e.g., goal-directed
theorem proving) figure out what to do
with intentional agents, we give a very abstract specification of the
system, and let the control mechanism figure out what to do, knowing
that it will act in accordance with the built-in theory of agency
Actually, the BDI framework combines in an excellent way both
(post)declarative structure and procedural knowledge in terms of plans.
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BDI Agents
Beliefs
Beliefs
Agents knowledge is structured in Beliefs about the current state of the
world
they are informational units, typically implemented as ground sets of
literals, possibly with no disjunctions or implications
they should reflect only the information which is currently held (i.e.
situated)
they are expected to change in the future, i.e., as well as the
environment changes
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BDI Agents
Plans
Plans
Plans represent the means the agent has to change the world, and to bring
it closer to his desires
they are language constructs, typically implemented in the form of
procedural structures
plans have a ‘body’, describing the workflow of activities (actions)
that have to be executed for plan execution to be succesful
the conditions under which a plan can be chosen as an option are
specified in an invocation condition (triggering event) and a pre- or
context- condition (situation that must hold for the plan to be
executable)
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BDI Agents
Intentions
Intentions
Intentions are emergent properties reified at runtime by selecting a given
plan for achieving a given goal
Represented ‘on-line’ using a run-time stack of hierarchically plans
related to the ongoing adopted goals
Similarly to how Prolog interpreter handle clauses
Multiple intention stacks can coexist, either running in parallel,
suspended until some condition occurs, or ordered for execution in
some way
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BDI Agents
BDI Agents Programming Platforms
JASON (Brasil) http://jason.sourceforge.net/ Agent platform
and language for BDI agents based on AgentSpeak(L)
JADEX (Germany) http://jadex.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/
Agent platform for BDI and Goal-Directed Agents
2APL (Netherlands) http://www.cs.uu.nl/2apl/ Agent
platform providing programming constructs to implement
cognitive agents based on the BDI architecture
3APL (Netherlands) http://www.cs.uu.nl/3apl/ A
programming language for implementing cognitive agents
PRACTIONIST (Italy) http://www.practionist.org/ Framework built
on the Bratman’s theory of practical reasoning to support
the development of BDI agents
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